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}}</ref> This case is significant because the Court required that [[circumcision]] be deferred until the boys are mature enough to decide for themselves if they wish to be circumcised. Their [[genital autonomy ]] and right to [[physical integrity ]] were protected.

The Court seems to have essentially adopted the mother’s position, which is entirely consistent with international [[human rights ]] law. The Court refused to order circumcision and said:

Taking all these matters into account, my conclusion is that it would be better for the children that the court make no order at this stage in relation to circumcision than to make the order which the father seeks. I am not dismissing his application on the basis that they must develop into adulthood as [[uncircumcised ]] Muslim males. I am simply deferring that decision to the point where each of the boys themselves will make their individual choices once they have the maturity and insight to appreciate the consequences and longer term effects of the decisions which they reach. Part of that consideration will be any increase in the risks of surgery by the time they have reached puberty. I do not regard the delay between now and that point in time significantly to increase those risks. The safest point in time to have carried out the procedure, according to Mr Muir, has long since passed.<ref name="roberts2016" />

Mrs. Justice Roberts, in making this order, placed the rights of the child above the rights of the two divorcing parents. She made no reference to international [[human rights ]] law. NevethelessNevertheless, her conclusion is entirely consistent with the rights of the child under [[Human rights| human rights law]]. Her order also is entirely in accord with Resolution 1952 of the [https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal Council of Europe].<ref name="resolution1952">{{REFdocument