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{{Construction Site}}'''Boldt v. Boldt''' is formally , framed as a child -custody case from originating in the state of Oregon, however it actually is about concerns the proposed non-therapeutic [[circumcision]] of a boy for the , intended to indulge his father's religious beliefurges.

The case started in 2004 when James Boldt, a divorced father, who had custody of his nine-year-old son, decided to convert from Russian Orthodox to [[Judaism ]] and wanted to have his son circumcised in accordance with the [[Abrahamic covenant]]. The son, however, had not converted and did not want to be circumcised. He was supported by his mother in his desire for [[genital integrity]].<ref name="svoboda2010">{{REFweb

The court did not think that the father's desire to cut off part of his son's [{[penis]] was grounds for a change of custody, however the court granted the injunction against the proposed circumcision. Lia Boldt then filed an appeal of the circuit court's decision with the [https://www.courts.oregon.gov/courts/appellate/coa/Pages/default.aspx Oregon Court of Appeals] (OCA).<ref name="svoboda2010" /> The OCA rejected Lia Boldt's appeal.

She then appealed to the [https://www.courts.oregon.gov/courts/appellate/supreme/Pages/default.aspx Oregon Supreme Court] (OSC) in 2007. It was at this point that [[Doctors Opposing Circumcision(D.O.C.)]] entered the case. [[Doctors Opposing Circumcision (D.O.C.)]] realized that the ORS OSC needed information about circumcision and about the child's rights under Constitutional and international [[human rights ]] law, so it filed an ''amicus curaie'' brief to help the Court understand why it should accept the case. The brief stated in part:

|publisher=[[Doctors Opposing Circumcision(D.O.C.)]]

After the OSC granted certiorarireview, DOC submitted a second ''amicus curiae'' brief to address the merits of the case. That second brief, in summation, stated:

There is no basis on which the father can hope to prevail in the face of overwhelming protections offered to Misha/Jimmy by the Washington, Oregon, and U.S. Constitutions, and moreover, in face of the protections offered by international treaties, in particular, the [[ICCPR]]. The Supreme Court has stated that "a child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution." There are no material facts at dispute that require further hearings on the child’s fundamental rights.<ref name="docbrief2">{{REFdocument

|publisher=[[Doctors Opposing Circumcision(D.O.C.)]]

The father, James Boldt, then appealed the decision of the OSC to the [https://www.supremecourt.gov/ United States Supreme Court], however a writ of certiorari was denied.<ref>555 US 814. No. 07–1348. ''Boldt v. Boldt''. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari de­nied. October 6, 2008. Reported below: 344 Ore. 1, 176 P. 3d 388. (2008).</ref>

[[John V. Geisheker | John Geisheker]] commented:

The child’s proposed circumcision, at one point only hours away, remains judicially prohibitedso the proposed circumcision was never carried out.<ref name="geisheker2010">{{REFjournal

Thus ended in victory a five-year legal battle to save a boy's [[foreskin]]. The boy's legal, constitutional, and [[human rights ]] prevailed over the father's claimed religious right to excise a [[Foreskin#Physiological_functions| functional body part]] from his son's body. The father's supporters, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America were also on the losing side.

[[Doctors Opposing Circumcision (D.O.C.)]] filed two ''amicus curiae'' briefs in this case and was successful in protecting the boy's [[foreskin]] from [[circumcision]].<ref name="docbrief1" /><ref name="docbrief2" />

The case also set a legal precedent regarding the rights of the male child to legal judicial protection of his person.

Though it is, in some respects, very unusual, this case nonetheless highlights a somewhat hidden and more widespread assumption embedded in our laws - that if a couple's mainstream religion requires them to inflict harm upon their child, then the law will not interfere with that prerogative. … In the ''Boldt '' case, the boy at issue is not a newborn but an adolescent, a 12-year-old, who not only has the self-evident capacity to feel pain but who could also offer his own opinion on the question of whether he should have his foreskin amputated. So far, we do not know from press accounts what the boy thinks about his father's plans, although his mother claims that he is opposed yet reluctant to say so. Even assuming, however, that the 12-year-old is neutral on the question, the notion of subjecting a child his age to such a surgery would likely seem barbaric to many people. There is, after all, no medical need to circumcise the boy. His foreskin is, so far as we know, not plagued with any disease or other malignancy. No doctor has offered the medical opinion that the family really ought to circumcise the boy. The only reason to do it is that his father has found religion and wishes to bring his son into the faith. … It is when parents disagree with each other and ask the courts to step in that we are uniquely able to consider some of the harm to which people expose their offspring. The ''Boldt '' case thus may, in this way, help us focus on what is otherwise "routine" in parenting and perhaps become more sensitive to the sorts of harm that we might otherwise continue to take for granted.<ref name="colb2007">{{REFweb

The US Supreme Court in October turned down a father’s petition in '' Boldt v Boldt''. The boy’s father, who converted to [[Judaism ]] and wants his son circumcised, was unhappy with the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court to determine the wishes of the child, and appealed to the US Supreme Court, alleging the child’s wishes are irrelevant. Fortunately, the right of the boy was paramount in the court’s decision.<ref>{{REFweb

Douglas Diekema(2009), a pediatric medical ethicist , commented:

In closing: children who are welcomed, gently, into their birth communities have been given the gift of Joel Feinberg’s “open future.” They may embrace their community or they may eventually drift away; there is no way to tell, in advance, what they will choose. But, importantly, their options are left open, and none of their body parts will have been surgically modified or removed —without — without their consent — prior to the moment when we will be able to hear the voices of the adults they will become.<ref name="geisheker2010" />

* The To date, with one known exception, all awards and settlements have occurred in cases involving either a “botched” procedure or a lack of [[Twelfth International Symposiuminformed consent]] on Law. At least three times, Genital Autonomycourts have avoided squarely addressing the legality of male circumcision by diverting the discussion into such peripheral, procedural issues as standing. Judicial views of standing are politically and culturally shaped in response to social mandates. Although MGC is currently illegal under existing laws and Human Rights[[human rights]] treaties, meeting at Helsinkiif properly and objectively interpreted free of cultural bias, adopted American cultural blindness has prevented recognition of this. Elsewhere in the world, Tasmania’s Law Review Commission recently released a lengthy issues paper questioning the legality of male circumcision. Sweden has regulated circumcision and the practice was recently made illegal in South Africa, with religious and medical exceptions included that threaten to swallow the rule. While the practice is not otherwise explicitly prohibited anywhere in the world, it is of course illegal worldwide under a broad range of prohibitions imposed by statute, common or civil law, [[Declaration of Helsinki (2012)human rights]]treaties, which calls for everyone to have a ''right of genital autonomy''and customary law. <ref name="svoboda2010" /></blockquote>

* British law professors Marie Fox and Michael Thompson examine ''Boldt v. Boldt'' in comparison with British legal decisions:<blockquote>On two occasions the Court of Appeal in England has addressed the legality of non-therapeutic circumcision performed on a minor unable to provide consent. Both cases involved disputes in post-separation families where one parent sought a male child’s circumcision against the wishes of the other parent. In January 2008, the Supreme Court of Oregon was faced with a similar factual situation in the case of ''Boldt v Boldt''. However, the boy at the center of the dispute in ''Boldt'' was significantly older than in the English cases. The Parliamentary Assembly Supreme Court therefore concluded that the testimony of the boy himself, who is now 13, was required and remanded the case for a re-hearing in order that the trial court could specifically address his wishes with regard to circumcision. In this paper, we offer a critique of the Oregon Court’s somewhat elliptical reasoning in the Boldt case. We argue that cases involving male circumcision of older children raise important ethico-legal issues, which the ''Boldt'' judgments gloss over, and which English courts have yet to confront in the context of circumcision. Consequently, our aim in this paper is to use ''Boldt'' as a lens through which to explore and inform UK practice. We argue that this case fits into a characteristic pattern according to which judges, law makers, and professional bodies shy away from confronting key ethico-legal questions raised by the tolerance in Anglo-American society of non-therapeutic genital cutting of male infants. In raising explicitly for the first time the position of older minors, the factual situation in ''Boldt'' affords us an opportunity to begin to address the limits of parents’ rights to determine the future religious identity of their children. In seeking to analyze how ''Boldt'' and the questions to which it gives rise might inform UK law we focus on three issues. The first is the [[Council right of Europe Debate Genital Cutting Of Boys| Council the boy at the center of Europe]]the dispute to determine which medical treatments or interventions to his body are permissible. The father’s subsequent petitions for reconsideration and for certiorari mean that, when the boy’s testimony is finally heard by a court, under it is likely that he will be 14 or 15 years of age. We aim to assess how a UK court might respond if faced with the leadership task of determining whether a minor could choose circumcision for himself in such a scenario. A subsidiary question here is the extent to which circumcision procedures are appropriately categorized as “medical treatment.” Finally, we offer some more tentative thoughts on what limits may legitimately be placed on [[Marlene Rupprechtparental rights]], adopted [httpto make choices for their children when their choices are motivated by religious belief.<ref name="fox2010">{{REFweb |url=https://wwwlink.circumstitionsspringer.com/Rightschapter/10.html#coe Resolution 1952] (2013) which calls for all member1007/978-90-481-9446-states to protect children from violation 9_2 |archived= |title=Older Minors and Circumcision: Questioning the Limits of their physical integrity by [[circumcision]]Religious Actions |trans-title= |language= |last=Fox |first=Marie |author-link= |publisher=Springer |website=springer. com |date=2010-08-20 |accessdate=2020-04-27 |format= |quote=}}</ref></blockquote>