Changes

[59] Circumcision of the male (from the Latin circumcidere to cut round) is the removal of some, or all, of the prepuce (foreskin), the retractable fold of [[skin ]] that surrounds and covers the [[glans ]] of the [[penis]], so as to expose the glans. Circumcision involves the removal of a significant amount of tissue, creates an obvious alteration to the appearance of the genitals and leaves a more or less prominent scar around the circumference of the [[penis]]. Apart from the removal of the foreskin, and sometimes of the frenulum, the ligament that connects the foreskin to the glans, the genitals are left intact.

[60] It can readily be seen that although FGM of WHO Types I, II and III are all very much more invasive than male circumcision, at least some forms of Type IV, for example, pricking, piercing and incising, are on any view much less invasive than male [[circumcision]].

[61] It is also important to recognise that comparatively few male circumcisions are performed for therapeutic reasons. Many are performed for religious reasons (as in [[Judaism ]] and [[Islam]]). However, large numbers of circumcisions are performed for reasons which, as the particular prevalence of the practice in, for example, the English-speaking world and non-Muslim Africa suggests, are as much to do with social, societal, cultural, customary or conventional reasons as with anything else, and this notwithstanding the justifications sometimes put forward, that [[circumcision ]] of the male is hygienic or has prophylactic benefits, for example, the belief that it reduces the incidence of penile cancer in the male, the incidence of cervical cancer in female partners and the incidence of [[HIV]] transmission.

[62] Now there is a very simple but important point to all this. There is nothing in the case-law to suggest that male [[circumcision ]] is, of itself, such as to justify care proceedings: see ''Re J'' (Specific Issue Orders: Muslim Upbringing and Circumcision) [1999] 2 FLR 678, on appeal ''Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision)'' [2000] 1 FLR 571, and ''Re S (Specific Issue Order: Religion: Circumcision)'' [2004] EWHC 1282 (Fam), [2005] 1 FLR 236. On the contrary, judges in the Family Division have on occasions made orders providing for non-therapeutic [[circumcision]]: see, for example, ''Re S (Change of Names: Cultural Factors)'' [2001] 2 FLR 1005, 1015-1016 ''(T v S (Wardship)'' [2011] EWHC 1608 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 230, was a case of a medically indicated circumcision). As against that, and as Mr Hayes helpfully points out, there are voices in the Academy who take a different view: see, for example, Christopher Price, Male Circumcision: An ethical and legal affront, Bulletin of Medical Ethics (May) 1997; 128, 13-19, and Brian D Earp, Female genital mutilation (FGM) and male circumcision: Should there be a separate ethical discourse, Practical Ethics (2014).

[63] In the present case the point arises in striking form. The family, as I have said are Muslims. I assume, therefore, that B either has been or will in due course be [[circumcised]]. Yet, entirely understandably, and, if I may say so, entirely appropriately, this is not a matter that has been raised before me. There is no suggestion, nor could there be, that B’s circumcision can or should give rise to care proceedings. So, given the nature of the local authority’s case on this point, we are in this curious situation. G’s FGM Type IV (had it been proved) would have been relied upon by the local authority, prior to its change of stance referred to above, as justifying the adoption of both children, even though on any objective view it might be thought that G would have subjected to a process much less invasive, no more traumatic (if, indeed, as traumatic) and with no greater long-term consequences, whether physical, emotional or psychological, than the process to which B has been or will be subjected.<ref name="bangham2015" />